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Excess reciprocity distorts 
reputation in online social networks
Giacomo Livan1,2, Fabio Caccioli1,2 & Tomaso Aste1,2
The peer-to-peer (P2P) economy relies on establishing trust in distributed networked systems, where 
the reliability of a user is assessed through digital peer-review processes that aggregate ratings into 
reputation scores. Here we present evidence of a network effect which biases digital reputation, 
revealing that P2P networks display exceedingly high levels of reciprocity. In fact, these are much 
higher than those compatible with a null assumption that preserves the empirically observed level of 
agreement between all pairs of nodes, and rather close to the highest levels structurally compatible 
with the networks’ reputation landscape. This indicates that the crowdsourcing process underpinning 
digital reputation can be significantly distorted by the attempt of users to mutually boost reputation, or 
to retaliate, through the exchange of ratings. We uncover that the least active users are predominantly 
responsible for such reciprocity-induced bias, and that this fact can be exploited to obtain more reliable 
reputation estimates. Our findings are robust across different P2P platforms, including both cases 
where ratings are used to vote on the content produced by users and to vote on user profiles.
The digital economy is increasingly self-organizing into a “platform society”1, 2 where individuals exchange 
knowledge, goods, and resources on a peer-to-peer (P2P) basis. In recent years we have indeed witnessed how a 
number of well-established business-to-consumer sectors, such as the taxi and hotel industries3, have been dis-
rupted by the emergence of the novel sharing economy P2P marketplaces.
P2P platforms rely on trust between their users. Trust is typically established by developing a reputation 
through digital peer-review mechanisms that allow users to rate their peers4, 5. Given the expected growth of the 
P2P paradigm, digital reputation will increasingly become central in our online lives, as it will determine access 
to substantial economic opportunities. Hence, it is crucial to ensure that digital peer-review systems produce 
reliable reputation scores.
Being decentralised, P2P systems are often thought to promote more economic freedom and democratisation. 
Yet, their current lack of regulation exposes them to a number of biases which can distort their functioning6–9. 
Game theoretic considerations10–12, and plenty of anecdotal evidence, suggest that users are often incentivised to 
reciprocate both positive and negative ratings.
In this paper we show that P2P systems are indeed statistically characterized by excessive reciprocity, and 
that, on average, one reciprocated rating contributes to a user’s reputation more than an unreciprocated one. The 
fact that reciprocity strongly affects reputation is rather relevant. Indeed, although it is true that the formation of 
social ties tends to be driven by homophily13, which in turn might lead similar individuals to reciprocate more 
than they would do otherwise, it is also well documented that P2P platform users also exchange positive ratings 
to mutually boost reputation. The “5 for 5” practice of Uber drivers and passengers, i.e. agreeing on exchanging 5 
star ratings at the beginning of a ride, is a common firsthand experience of such a practice14, and similar phenom-
ena have been reported in the interactions between eBay buyers and sellers15, 16 and Airbnb hosts and guests17. 
Symmetrically, negative reciprocity due to mutually honest negative feedback needs to be distinguished from the 
retaliatory exchange of negative ratings. Therefore, our results show that a central issue in the design of P2P rating 
systems is that of discerning the information content of reciprocated ratings.
Reputation in online marketplaces is known to affect a buyer’s willingness to pay16. In this respect, the 
exchange of ratings effectively introduces externalities in P2P platforms18, as they prevent users from making 
informed ex ante decisions about their peers. Moreover, the anticipation of retaliatory behaviour can discourage 
users from providing negative feedback19. In fact, it is well known that online ratings are often skewed towards 
positive values8, 20. In summary, an excess of reciprocity may deteriorate the overall information content in P2P 
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platforms and pose a threat to their fairness and transparency. We quantify the excess of reciprocity in P2P rating 
systems with respect to a range of null hypotheses, and measure the impact it has in shaping online reputation. We 
do so by taking a deliberately reductionist approach. Namely, we investigate three case studies of P2P platforms 
with binary interactions, i.e. platforms whose users can either choose to endorse or reject their peers’ activity. 
These environments represent a stylised template of the feedback systems underpinning P2P platforms, and allow 
for a parsimonious representation in terms of signed networks: A positive (negative) interaction between two 
platform users can be represented as a link carrying a positive (negative) sign between two nodes in a graph. 
Such systems have attracted considerable attention in the network literature21–23, as they offer a natural labora-
tory to test theories for systems with antagonistic interactions, such as social balance theory24–26 and consensus 
formation27.
This network representation is particularly useful to quantify the statistical significance of reciprocity and its 
impact on user reputation. Indeed, the properties of multi-agent interacting systems can often be encoded into 
well defined network motifs. This, in turn, allows to quantify the statistical significance of empirically observed 
features by verifying whether certain motifs are still observed in null models in which the network topology is 
partially randomised. This approach has found successful applications in a great variety of fields, contributing to 
identifying relevant patterns, e.g., in the world trade web28 and in interbank credit networks29.
We encode reciprocity as the fraction of mutual dyads in a network30, and compare the impact it has in shap-
ing user reputation in the three networks we study as opposed to the one observed in two ensembles of null mod-
els. We build a first ensemble by partially randomizing the empirical networks with a link reshuffling procedure 
designed to preserve the reputation of each user at a predefined level of positive or negative reciprocity. We then 
proceed to investigate the role of homophily, which, as mentioned above, may act as a natural source of reciproc-
ity, especially in platforms where the nature of positive interactions is particularly friendly, e.g., where positive 
ratings are expressed by “friending” peers. This is particularly challenging with the data we employ, as they do not 
provide any categorisation of the nodes in terms of relevant features, which prevents any direct measurement of 
homophily. To this end, we devise a simple metric of preference similarity to quantify the propensity of pairs of 
nodes to agree in their endorsements or dislikes of other peers. We adopt such a metric as a proxy for homophily, 
and build a second null network ensemble through a link reshuffling procedure that preserves this quantity for 
each pair of nodes together with the reputation of each node. In conclusion, our work cannot explicitly distin-
guish between “malicious” reciprocity (as in the aforementioned 5 for 5 practice) and “benign” reciprocity, but 
provides statistically robust results by assessing the likelihood of generating empirically observed features of P2P 
platforms through partially randomised dynamics.
Within this framework, we quantify the role of rating reciprocity in distorting user reputations, and we even-
tually demonstrate that more reliable estimates of user reputation can be obtained by discounting reciprocated 
ratings from the least active users. As we will discuss in detail, the three case studies we analyse share a number of 
regularities despite the very different nature of the user interactions taking place in each of them.
Results
Signed networks and reciprocity. We analyse data from three P2P platforms: Slashdot, Epinions, and 
Wikipedia (see Materials and Methods). The data are freely available and can be downloaded from the Koblenz 
Network Collection repository31. We apply a filtering procedure to all three networks in order to discard the 
contributions from casual platform users and only retain the activity of actively engaged ones. In Table 1 we pro-
vide details about the size and composition of such networks, and in the Supplementary Information we provide 
detailed evidence that our results do not depend on the specificities of the filtering procedure.
We represent a P2P platform of N users exchanging positive and negative ratings as a signed network, i.e. a set 
of N nodes described by a square N × N adjacency matrix A, whose entries are Aij = 1 (Aij = −1) if user i has given 
a positive (negative) rating to user j, and Aij = 0 if node i has not rated node j. We say that a pair of positive (nega-
tive) links are reciprocated if Aij = Aji = +1 (Aij = Aji = −1). With this notation, one can introduce the number of 
unreciprocated positive and negative ratings received by a user i (in the following Θ(x) denotes the step function 
such that Θ(x) = 1 for x > 0 and Θ(x) = 0 otherwise)
∑ ∑φ φ= Θ − Θ = Θ − − Θ −+
=
−
=
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and the number of reciprocated positive and negative ratings received by a user i
Ntot N L+ L− ξ+ ξ−
Slashdot 79,120 4,611 105,115 29,190 4.9 × 10−3 1.4 × 10−3
Epinions 131,828 8,732 425,377 40,996 5.6 × 10−3 5.4 × 10−3
Wikipedia 138,592 5,538 160,606 29,327 5.2 × 10−3 9.6 × 10−4
Table 1. Network statistics. The first column shows the total number of nodes Ntot in the original unfiltered 
networks. The other columns show the number of users N, the number of positive (L+) and negative (L−) 
ratings, and the sparsity ξ± (measured as the ratio between the number of existing links and the overall number 
of possible links, i.e. ξ = ∑ Θ ± −± = A N N( )/( ( 1))i jN ij, 1  of the networks when restricted to a high participation 
core of actively engaged users with at least ten combined ratings (received and given).
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In the Supplementary Information we provide details about the statistical properties of the above quantities. 
We then define φΦ = ∑+ =
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i1 ) as the total number of positive 
(negative) ratings exchanged in the platform that belong to each category.
Within this context, we define positive (negative) reciprocity as the fraction of ratings i → j that have a match-
ing rating j → i of the same sign, and we denote it as ρ+ (p−). With the above definitions we have
ρ ρ= Γ = Γ+
+
+
−
−
−L L
, ,
(3)
where L+ = Φ++Γ+ (L− = Φ−+Γ−) is the total number of positive (negative) links. From a network perspective, 
this definition is meaningful in the systems in the systems under consideration as they are very sparse (see 
Table 1). In dense networks, where links are somewhat forced to reciprocate simply due to structural constraints, 
it could be replaced by the one introduced in32, which discounts density-related effects. This definition reads 
ρ ρ ξ ξ= − −+ + + +ˆ ( )/(1 ), where ρ+ is as in (3) and ξ = ∑ Θ −+ = A N N( )/( ( 1))i jN ij, 1  represents the density of the 
positive subnetwork. This definition straightforwardly generalizes to the negative subnetwork, and we report the 
corresponding values in Table 1. As it can be seen from the Table, all density values are of order 10−3 or 10−4, and 
therefore have a negligible impact on reciprocity.
Reputation. Using the quantities introduced in Eqs (1) and (2), we define the reputation of user i as
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i.e. as the difference between the number of positive ( φ γ= ++ + +Li i i ) and negative ( φ γ= +
− − −Li i i ) ratings 
received normalised by the overall number of ratings received. The above definition of reputation is such that 
−1≤Ri≤1, where Ri = 1 (Ri = −1) for a user that has received positive (negative) ratings only.
We then define the average contributions to reputation associated with one unreciprocated or reciprocated 
positive (negative) rating, which we denote as λΦ
+ and λΓ
+ (λΦ
− and λΓ
−), respectively. Recalling that Φ± and Γ± 
indicate, respectively, the total numbers of unreciprocated and reciprocated positive/negative ratings in the net-
works, and introducing the total reputation in the network = ∑ =R RiN i1 , we can write
λ λ λ λ= Φ − Φ + Γ − Γ .Γ Γ
+
Φ
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Φ
− + + − −R
From the above equation one can obtain the following explicit expressions:
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Excess reciprocity. We compare the reciprocity observed in the empirical networks with the one measured 
under two null assumptions designed to preserve the overall reputation landscape of the network: In both cases 
we reshuffle links in the network while preserving the numbers of positive/negative ratings received and given 
by each individual node (see Materials and Methods). We also introduce a positive/negative reciprocity target τ± 
and we require the reshuffling algorithms to converge towards it by means of a cost function which depends on 
an “intensity of choice” parameter β ≥ 0. When β = 0 the reshuffling procedure is fully random and not sensitive 
to the reciprocity target. On the other hand, for large values of β the algorithm forces the networks, compatibly 
with the aforementioned constraints, towards configurations that produce the desired level of reciprocity τ± (see 
Materials and Methods).
We indicate the two null models as NM1 and NM2, respectively, and we specify them as follows.
•	 NM1 produces randomised configurations of the empirical networks at a predefined positive (negative) reci-
procity target τ+ (τ−) while preserving the reputation score Ri (see Eq. (4)) of each node i.
•	 NM2 produces randomised configurations of the empirical networks at a predefined positive (negative) rec-
iprocity target τ+ (τ−) while preserving both the reputation score of each node and the preference similarity 
of each pair of nodes.
We define the preference similarity of a pair of nodes (i, j) as
∑= .
=
 
S A A
(6)ij
N
i j
1
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
4Scientific RepoRts | 7: 3551  | DOI:10.1038/s41598-017-03481-7
The above quantity measures the level of agreement between two nodes. Indeed, whenever nodes i and j both 
endorse or dislike a third peer  (i.e. when = =
 
A A 1i j  or = = − A A 1i j ) the above sum increases by one, 
whereas when the two nodes disagree (i.e. when ≠

A 0i , ≠

A 0j , and = − A Ai j ) it decreases by one. In this 
respect, we consider preference similarity as a reasonable proxy for the underlying level of homophily between 
pairs of nodes. Let us also remark that NM1 preserves preference similarity globally, i.e. it preserves the sum 
= ∑ <S Si j ij. On the other hand, NM2 preserves preference similarity both locally and globally, and it also cap-
tures fairly well the empirical statistical properties of the preference similarity between pairs of nodes that share 
and do not share reciprocated relationships (see Supplementary Information).
We first compare the empirically observed reciprocity levels with the ones measured in the above null models 
when carrying out the link reshuffling at β = 0, which produces maximally randomised counterparts of the repu-
tation landscapes observed in the empirical networks, and therefore allows to measure a “basal” reciprocity ρ ±0  
that remains in the system due to its density and the constraints on reputation and preference similarity. Table 2 
shows that the positive reciprocity measured in the empirical networks is markedly over-expressed with respect 
to the positive basal reciprocity levels of both null models. Table 3 reports the results we obtained for negative 
reciprocity. Slashdot is the only network whose empirical negative reciprocity is over-expressed with respect to 
both null models. Indeed, while negative reciprocity in Epinions and Wikipedia is substantially over-expressed 
with respect to NM1, it is compatible with the one measured in NM2 in Epinions, and it is slightly under-expressed 
with respect to NM2 in Wikipedia.
For large β, we can instead push the reshuffled networks towards targets higher than the reciprocity observed 
in the empirical networks. We find that all three platforms reach a saturation both in positive and negative reci-
procity, i.e. the networks run out of links that can be used to reciprocate while still preserving each node’s reputa-
tion and, in the case of NM2, local preference similarity. We report such values as ρ +SAT and ρ
−
SAT in Tables 2 and 3, 
respectively. Both Slashdot and Epinions reach saturation shortly after the target τ+ exceeds the actual positive 
reciprocity ρ+, i.e. the ratio ρ ρ+ +/SAT  is only slightly larger than one. This is especially evident in NM2 where the 
local structure of preference similarity is kept intact. On the contrary, Wikipedia can sustain values of reciprocity 
much larger than ρ+, i.e. the ratio ρ ρ+ +/SAT  is larger than 2 in NM1 and close to 1.5 in NM2. We relate this to the 
different nature of the interactions. Indeed, interactions in Slashdot, where positive and negative links correspond 
to users tagging each other as “friend” or “foe”, encourage backscratching and retaliatory behaviour, whereas a 
collaborative environment such as Wikipedia is subject to a different incentive structure. This picture is corrobo-
rated by the findings on negative reciprocity, where the ratio ρ ρ− −/SAT  increases substantially as progressing from 
Slashdot to Wikipedia. The general remark one can make from such results is that more polarised P2P environ-
ments are closer to their reciprocity saturation levels.
Production of reputation through reciprocity. We now ask whether reciprocity biases reputation in 
P2P systems, and, if so, to what extent. To this end, we have divided ratings into four categories: unreciprocated 
positive ratings, unreciprocated negative ratings, reciprocated positive ratings, and reciprocated negative ratings 
(see Eqs (1) and (2)). Unreciprocated ratings can be reasonably assumed to represent objective assessments, and 
ρ+
Null model 1 Null model 2
ρ +0 ρ
+
SAT ρ
+
0 ρ
+
SAT
Slashdot 41.3% [2.28;2.53]% [46.6,47.0]% [4.81;4.96]% [42.4;42.6]%
Epinions 42.4% [2.33;2.49]% [48.2;48.4]% [4.58;4.66]% [43.1;43.2]%
Wikipedia 17.6% [3.01;3.27]% [36.8;37.2]% [3.49;362]% [25.4;25.8]%
Table 2. Over-expression of positive reciprocity in P2P platforms. Comparison between the positive reciprocity 
ρ+ observed in the three networks we analyse and the 99% confidence level intervals for the corresponding 
“basal” levels ρ +0  and saturation levels ρ
+
SAT obtained under a null hypothesis of random link rewiring 
constrained to preserve each user’s reputation (null model 1), and a null hypothesis further constrained to also 
preserve the preference similarity of each pair of nodes (null model 2, see Eq. (6)).
ρ−
Null model 1 Null model 2
ρ−0 ρ
−
SAT ρ
−
0 ρ
−
SAT
Slashdot 15.9% [0.35;062]% [25.6;26.2]% [9.05;9.55]% [20.2;20.8]%
Epinions 7.70% [1.08;1.42]% [24.9;25.3]% [7.33;7.90]% [18.5;19.0]%
Wikipedia 8.50% [1.84;2.45]% [48.4;49.1]% [8.57;9.18]% [33.7;34.2]%
Table 3. Over-expression of negative reciprocity in P2P platforms. Comparison between the negative 
reciprocity ρ− observed in the three networks we analyse and the 99% confidence level intervals for the 
corresponding “basal” levels ρ −0  and saturation levels ρ
−
SAT obtained under a null hypothesis of random link 
rewiring constrained to preserve each user’s reputation (null model 1), and a null hypothesis further constrained 
to also preserve the preference similarity of each pair of nodes (null model 2, see Eq. (6)).
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their contribution to reputation can be thought of as a proxy of a user’s “true” reputation. On the other hand, a 
fraction of the reciprocated ratings could be due to collusion and retaliation.
We compute the average contribution to reputation coming from ratings belonging to each of the four above 
categories. We do so by means of the quantities introduced in Eq. (5). Table 4 reports the values of these quanti-
ties. In all cases we find that λ λ>Γ Φ
+ +, i.e. on average a reciprocated positive rating contributes more to total 
reputation than an unreciprocated one. We instead find mixed signatures in the case of negative ratings: only in 
Slashdot, where negative interactions are genuinely hostile (users labeling their peers as “foes”), we observe 
λ λ>Γ Φ
− −, i.e. that reciprocated negative ratings play a larger role in damaging reputation than unreciprocated 
ones. We interpret this as a signature of retaliatory behaviour.
We test the statistical significance of the above findings by resorting again to our two null hypotheses based 
on constrained random link rewiring. Fig. 1 shows the average contributions to reputation coming from posi-
tive reciprocated and unreciprocated ratings as functions of the ratio between the reciprocity target τ+ and the 
positive reciprocity ρ+ of the empirical networks. A number of relevant results can be deduced from this Figure.
First, the behaviour of the two quantities as functions of τ+ is markedly different. The contribution from recip-
rocated positive ratings λΓ
+ is monotonically increasing, whereas the contribution from unreciprocated positive 
ratings λΦ
+ attains a maximum in correspondence of a certain reciprocity target. In Slashdot and Epinions, such a 
value is around 50% of the reciprocity observed in the empirical networks in both null models. Conversely, reci-
procity in the Wikipedia network has to be increased with respect to its original level in order to reach the maxi-
mum contribution from unreciprocated activity.
λΦ
+ λΓ
+ λΦ
− λΓ
−
Slashdot 0.0323 0.0355 0.0340 0.0522
Epinions 0.0156 0.0220 0.0236 0.0157
Wikipedia 0.0270 0.0325 0.0362 0.0321
Table 4. Evidence that reciprocated ratings contribute more to reputation than unreciprocated ones. λΦ
± denote 
the average contribution to reputation from a positive/negative unreciprocated rating, while λΓ
± denote the 
average contribution from a positive/negative reciprocated rating.
Figure 1. Demonstration that reputation is affected by the reciprocity bias. Behaviour of the average 
contribution to reputation from unreciprocated positive ratings (λΦ
+, pink) and reciprocated positive ratings 
(λΓ
+, blue) under two null hypotheses of random link rewiring designed to produce a predefined positive 
reciprocity target τ+. Circles refer to a null hypothesis constrained to preserve the reputation of each user (null 
model 1), while crosses refer to a null hypothesis further constrained to also preserve the preference similarity 
of each pair of nodes (null model 2, see also Eq. (6)). The behaviour of λΦ
+ and λΓ
+ is shown as a function of the 
ratio between the reciprocity target τ+ and the positive reciprocity ρ+ measured in the actual platforms (column 
1 of Table 1). Error bars correspond to 99% confidence level intervals. Dashed lines correspond to the values of 
λΦ
+ (pink) and λΓ
+ (blue) measured in the actual platforms (i.e. to the values reported in columns 1 and 2, 
respectively, of Table 3). The fact that the contribution from reciprocated (unreciprocated) activity in the actual 
platforms is systematically lower (higher) than under our null hypotheses highlights the existence of the 
reciprocity bias.
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Second, throughout the whole range of reciprocity shown in Fig. 1, we find that the contribution to reputation 
from unreciprocated activity is under-expressed in the real systems. Symmetrically, the contribution from recip-
rocated ratings is systematically over-expressed. Both these conditions hold regardless of the specific null model 
(see Section S5 in the Supplementary Information for a comparison with a different null model based on link and 
sign reshuffling), and hold for any value of the parameter β (see Fig. S5 in the Supplementary Information). This 
highlights the existence of what we call reciprocity bias: Reciprocated activity plays an exceedingly large role in 
shaping reputation at the aggregate level.
Third, in null models the relative importance between reciprocated and unreciprocated activity is reversed 
with respect to the one observed in the actual networks. As shown in Table 4, in the empirical networks one pos-
itive reciprocated rating always contributes more to reputation, on average, than an unreciprocated one (i.e. 
λ λ>Γ
+
Φ
+). In contrast, under our null hypotheses the opposite holds over a wide range of the reciprocity target 
τ+. Namely, one has λ λ<Γ
+
Φ
+ almost up to the saturation threshold. Notably, both in Slashdot (for NM1) and 
Wikipedia one has λ λ<Γ
+
Φ
+ even when the reciprocity target is kept equal to its empirical value, i.e. when 
τ+ = ρ+ (dashed vertical lines in Fig. 1). This is a case where our null hypotheses entail the injection of a minimal 
amount of randomness into the system, as the only rewiring operations allowed are those that do not change 
reciprocity even at the local level. In the following we further demonstrate that P2P dynamics drive the networks 
towards very “atypical” states whose main features are not robust to small perturbations, and we will exploit this 
point to investigate possible prototypes of regulatory countermeasures to prevent users from building reputation 
through excessive reciprocity.
Suppressing the reciprocity bias through random link elimination. Figure 2 shows the behaviour 
of the average contribution to reputation from reciprocated (λΓ
+) and unreciprocated (λΦ
+) positive ratings upon 
the removal of reciprocated ratings. Namely, we randomly select pairs of users and check whether a reciprocated 
rating between them exists. If so, we remove it. Notably, in Slashdot the deletion of 3% of the reciprocated positive 
ratings (i.e. slightly more than 1.2% of the overall positive ratings) is enough to make the contributions to reputa-
tion from reciprocated and unreciprocated ratings statistically compatible. The same result is achieved by remov-
ing roughly 8% of the reciprocated positive ratings in Epinions, and roughly 11% of the reciprocated positive 
ratings in Wikipedia (corresponding, respectively, to 3.3% and 1.9% of the overall positive ratings). Furthermore, 
one can also see from Fig. 2 that statistical compatibility between λΓ
+ and λΦ
+ as measured in the full networks and 
in the networks after the removal of a few ratings is lost extremely fast, i.e. by removing roughly 1% of the recip-
rocated positive ratings.
Given the heavy tailed nature of the distributions of ratings given and received by each node (see Fig. S2 in 
the Supplementary Information), a statistical feature common to many networked systems33, the above protocol 
mostly targets and penalises users with a lower number of ratings, while leaving users with many reciprocated 
links relatively untouched. Although this might seem unfair at first, let us remark that the networks we analyse 
are high participation cores, where the contribution from casual platform users has already been filtered out. 
Moreover, such a protocol is meaningful from the viewpoint of user incentives: Indeed, a newcomer to a platform 
is more incentivised to reciprocate in order to boost her visibility in the network, whereas a high activity user with 
good reputation has little marginal gain from an additional rating. In this respect, removing ratings between low 
activity users is key to suppressing the reciprocity bias and improving the average quality of ratings (see Fig. S8 in 
the Supplementary Information).
The above exercise obviously neglects the complexities that translating such a procedure into an actual plat-
form management policy would entail. Indeed, an explicit policy of random link removal of reciprocated links 
would discourage users from rating each other at all: no rating would be reciprocated (as any reciprocated pair 
Figure 2. Demonstration that the elimination of a small fraction of ratings suppresses the reciprocity bias. Solid 
lines show the average contribution to reputation from unreciprocated (λΦ
+, pink) and reciprocated (λΓ
+, blue) 
positive links as a function of the fraction of reciprocated positive links removed from the network. Circles 
represent the behaviour of such quantities when a random node selection protocol is followed, i.e. nodes are 
chosen at random with uniform probability and reciprocated positive links between them, if any, are removed. 
Error bars represent 99% confidence level intervals.
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would become liable to being removed), which in turn would discourage providing ratings in the first place. Yet, 
it is interesting to consider the above procedure as a thought experiment to measure the fragility of the reciprocity 
bias.
Discussion
The present paper provides a first systematic study of the network effects shaping digital reputation in P2P plat-
forms. In this work we have tested the statistical significance of a number of empirical facts consistently observed 
in Slashdot, Epinions, and Wikipedia. We have done so by investigating a range of null models designed to pre-
serve the individual reputation of each user and the preference similarities of pairs of users while probing differ-
ent rating patterns that could have produced them. This effectively amounts to exploring “alternate realities” of 
P2P systems, while still keeping their heterogeneity fully intact at the level of individual users.
The overarching question we addressed in this framework is whether P2P platform users excessively engage 
in rating reciprocity in order to improve their reputation or to affect that of others. We do find that reciprocity, 
especially in the positive case, is substantially over-expressed with respect to null benchmarks. Moreover, we find 
that reciprocated ratings contribute more to reputation than unreciprocated ones. This is at odds with what we 
observe in the aforementioned null models. Even when we incorporate the tendency of users with similar like/
dislike patterns to also like each other, we still find that unreciprocated activity dominates the production of rep-
utation. In other words, this shows that the same individual reputations are compatible with very different rating 
patterns between the users. In conclusion, the local structure of the networks is responsible for the distortions 
observed at the macroscopic level.
The above point suggests that P2P systems exist in very peculiar states. Indeed, the contribution to reputation 
from reciprocated activity is systematically over-expressed with respect to all of the null hypotheses we consider, 
and a small random perturbation is enough to make unreciprocated activity the prevalent contribution. This 
point is evocative of other results concerning the beneficial effects of randomness in complex systems34–38, 40, and 
suggests that an effective policy to prevent users from building reputation through excessive reciprocity would 
be that of injecting a small amount of randomness into the system. We validated this hypothesis by carrying out 
a random link elimination procedure in the three networks we analysed, which shows that the removal of recip-
rocated links between users with a low number of ratings, hence highly incentivised to boost reputation, is most 
effective.
Our investigation highlights that interactions of a different nature (i.e., collaborative vs antagonistic) lead 
to different network signatures. Both in Slashdot and Epinions, suppressing reciprocity unquestionably makes 
unreciprocated ratings the prevalent contribution to reputation, up to a point (roughly corresponding to 50% of 
the reciprocity observed in the actual networks, see Fig. 1) where the contribution from unreciprocated activ-
ity reaches a maximum. Conversely, and rather paradoxically, in the Wikipedia network reciprocity has to be 
increased with respect to its original level in order to reach the maximum contribution from unreciprocated 
activity. Indeed, Wikipedia reaches the highest average contribution to reputation from unreciprocated activity 
for reciprocity values higher than the one observed in the actual network. We speculate that this is due to the 
different outcomes that such networks aim to achieve. In essence, Wikipedia is a collaborative content-driven 
environment whose users cooperate to the creation of a common good, i.e. knowledge. In contrast, Epinions and 
Slashdot have a more personal trait, as in both cases interactions are opinion-driven: Users form relationships 
based on the endorsement or rejection of their peers’ views. Our results suggest that an increase in reciprocity in 
a content-driven environment might lead to increased collaboration and, ultimately, to an improved quality of 
the ratings exchanged by the users. This aspect certainly deserves further attention through the analysis of other 
P2P networks.
Due to the lack of information about the users’ identity and features, our paper does not investigate directly 
how homophily (i.e. the tendency to interact with similar individuals in social networks13, 39) might contribute 
to explain the exceedingly high levels of reciprocity and their impact on user reputation. Yet, the null network 
ensembles employed to carry out our statistical analyses are specifically designed to preserve the preference sim-
ilarity structure of the networks, i.e. the tendency of certain pairs of users to endorse/reject the same content, 
which in itself represents a fairly close proxy for network homophily. In particular, we tested whether our conclu-
sions are robust when compared to a null hypothesis that only preserves preference similarity at a global level as 
opposed to a more stringent null hypothesis designed to preserve preference similarity at the level of individual 
pairs of nodes. Interestingly, we found our results on positive excess reciprocity and its impact on reputation to be 
largely independent of the particular null assumption, i.e. the basal positive reciprocity levels and the contribu-
tions to reputation (see Fig. 1) observed when keeping the local preference similarity structure intact are not sig-
nificantly different from those observed when this is not preserved. This suggests that homophily alone would not 
be able to justify the high levels of positive reciprocity we empirically observe and their impact on user reputation. 
On the other hand, preserving the local similarity structure essentially captures most of the empirical positive rec-
iprocity. Indeed, although not statistically compatible, the saturation reciprocity levels measured when accounting 
for preference similarity are remarkably close to the empirically observed ones in Slashdot and Epinions. This 
suggests that homophily drives the growth of opinion-driven platforms in such a way as to maximize positive 
reciprocity. Symmetrically, the basal levels of negative reciprocity measured when accounting for homophily 
essentially capture the empirical levels in Epinions and Wikipedia, i.e. the exchange of negative ratings cannot be 
distinguished from a partially randomized dynamics when negative interactions lack an explicitly hostile trait.
The systems we study in this paper are simpler than the most popular P2P platforms where users build a 
peer-review based reputation, such as Uber and Airbnb. Yet, they retain the full complexity of those richer 
environments, both in terms of interaction patterns and user heterogeneity. It is precisely because of such a 
“stylised-yet-complex” nature that we chose signed networks as templates for P2P systems. In this respect, our 
work advances the existing literature on reciprocity and reputation in online environments, where most empirical 
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results are tied to the specificities of a particular platform or rating system, and therefore lack generality. Our 
work provides a “one-fits-all” network methodology that can be used as soon as user interactions in a platform 
can be classified as either positive or negative, which can be achieved quite easily for the most common types of 
online feedback (e.g., by thresholding in the case of graded scales and via sentiment analysis in the case of textual 
ratings). The potential of such a reductionist approach is highlighted by the consistency of the regularities that 
we detect in the three platforms we analyse, despite the vastly different natures of the user interactions that char-
acterise them. For instance, we observe qualitatively similar patterns of reputation formation in Slashdot, where 
votes are expressed directly on a whole user profile, and in Wikipedia, where edits express indirect votes on the 
quality of the content produced by others.
Our analyses show that P2P rating systems are plagued by biases. We have shown that the most widely adopted 
reputation metrics, i.e. those based on naive rating aggregation, are particularly vulnerable to distortions, which 
we have related with the presence of non-trivial network effects and motifs. In this respect, our work highlights 
the yet largely untapped potential that network science applications have in the digital economy domain, and 
suggests that novel, network-based, notions of reputation could be the way to ensure the fairness that P2P systems 
promise to deliver.
Materials and Methods
Data. The data we analyze belong the the following platforms:
•	 Slashdot, a website whose users post, read and comment news about science and technology. The data we 
analyse pertain to the Slashdot Zoo, i.e. the set of friendship/enmity relationships that Slashdot users form. 
Namely, users can label each other as “friend” (“foe”) in order to endorse (oppose) opinions and activity on 
the platform.
•	 Epinions, a platform for crowdsourced consumer reviews whose users exchange insight about a variety of 
products. Based on their review history, users can express trust/distrust relationships to each other.
•	 A collection of actions from 563 Wikipedia articles about politics, where each interaction between users 
(such as co-edits, antagonistic edits, reverts, restores, etc.) was interpreted as positive or negative value 
depending on its nature.
A substantial portion of the users in the above networks are casual users who do not interact frequently with 
the platform. In fact, 32% of Slashdot users, 47% of Epinions users, and 49% of Wikipedia users have either 
given or received just one rating. We therefore proceed to filter the noisy contribution from casual platform 
users, in order to ensure that reputation scores are computed from the ratings of actively committed users. The 
above network datasets do not provide information about possible repeated interactions between the users, which 
prevents from applying network statistical validation techniques that explictly account for the heterogeneity in 
user activity (see, e.g. ref. 40). Hence, we choose to restrict the networks to a high participation core of actively 
engaged users with a number of total ratings (received and given) equal or higher than a threshold t. Clearly, after 
the deletion of these nodes, some other nodes might result to be disconnected in the restricted network, as there 
is no guarantee that the t (or more) received/given ratings are exchanged with other nodes within the core. We 
therefore carry out a second filtering in order to remove disconnected nodes. This operation leaves us with the 
networks whose statistical properties are described in Table 1. In Section S7 of the Supplementary Information we 
provide evidence that our main results are consistent across different thresholds.
Null models. In order to assess the statistical significance of the features observed in the empirical networks, 
we define two ensembles of null network models (labeled as NM1 and NM2 in the following) that depend on two 
parameters. Namely, we define a positive reciprocity target τ+, and we introduce a cost function 
τ ρ τ= −+ + + +H L( ) [ ( )]2 to measure the distance between the current positive reciprocity in the network and the 
target (the following can be straightforwardly generalized to the case of negative reciprocity). Starting from the 
empirical networks, we perform rewiring operations in order to decrease the cost function’s value, i.e. to make the 
networks’ reciprocity converge to the predefined target. We do so in a probabilistic manner: we iteratively propose 
random rewiring operations and we accept them with probability
β τ =
+
β τ
β τ
+
− ∆
− ∆
+
+p
e
e
( , )
1
,
(7)
H
H
( )
( )
where τ∆ +H( ) measures the change in cost that would be achieved upon accepting the rewiring move (i.e. the 
difference between the cost function after and before the rewiring), and β ≥ 0 is an “intensity of choice” parame-
ter that determines the rewiring procedure’s responsiveness to changes in cost: When β = 0 the above probability 
is equal to 1/2, which amounts to a fully random rewiring (independently of the target τ+), whereas when β is 
large rewiring moves that cause an increase (decrease) in cost get rejected (accepted) with probability close to one.
The link rewiring works as follows. In NM1:
•	 Two pairs of distinct nodes (i, k) and j( , ) connected by two positive links (i.e. = =

A A 1ik j ), and such that 
= =

A A 0i jk , are chosen at random.
•	 The change τ∆ +H( ) in cost function that would be attained by disconnecting the existing links i → k and 
→ j  and replacing them with links → i  and j → k (i.e. setting = =

A A 0ik j  and = =A A 1i jk ) is 
computed.
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In NM2:
•	 Two triplet of nodes (i, j, k) and h g( , , ) connected by at least two pairs of positive links (i.e. such that 
= =A A 1ik jk  and = = A A 1h g ), and such that = = = = A A A A 0i j hk gk , are chosen at random.
•	 The change τ∆ +H( ) in cost function that would be attained by disconnecting the existing links i → k, j → k 
and replacing them with links → i  and → j , and by disconnecting the existing links → h , → g  and 
replacing them with l inks h  →  k  and g  →  k  ( i .e .  sett ing = = = =
 
A A A A 0ik jk h g  and 
= = = =
 
A A A A 1i j hk gk ) is computed.
Then, for both null models:
•	 With the probability β τ+p( , ) in Eq. (7) the above rewiring moves are accepted and carried out. With proba-
bility β τ− +p1 ( , ) the rewiring moves are rejected and all links are kept as they are.
•	 The above operations are repeated until a steady state is reached, which in the long run is ensured by the prob-
abilistic rule in Eq. (7), where β plays the role of an inverse temperature in a physical system (see Section S2 
in the Supplementary Information).
In Fig. 3 we sketch the two fundamental rewiring moves of the above null models, and we report two examples 
in which they cause the overall positive/negative reciprocity of the network to decrease ( ρ∆ <± 0) and to increase 
( ρ∆ >± 0).
The above procedures are reminiscent of the directed configuration model from the literature on complex 
networks41, 42, and consist in randomly redirecting ratings, hence destroying correlations between raters and 
ratees, while preserving both the reputation of each node and the system’s heterogeneity at a fixed level of reci-
procity. In fact, the above rewiring procedures preserve the number of positive/negative ratings received and 
given by each node i, i.e. they preserve the sums φ γ++ +i i  and φ γ+
− −
i i , although, crucially, the individual values 
of φ ±i  and γ
±
i  are in general changed. Thus, according to Eq. (4) our rewiring procedures keep the reputation Ri of 
each node intact.
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